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THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO
INHERIT PROPERTY
There has never been much argument as to whether the
right to inherit property is a civil or a natural one. Since
that right is generally accepted as civil, the cases in point
are almost unanimously in accord. In In re Stanford's
Estate 1 the court considered it "elementary law" that the
right of inheritance was entirely a matter of statutory en-
actment and within the control of the legislature, and that
it was only by virtue of statute that an heir was entitled to
receive any of his ancestor's estate. This line of thought is
followed in Illinois in In re Estate of Speed 2 where it was
said that while the right to inherit property under the Statute
of Wills and Descent was property, it was so only because
the legislature had seen fit to create the right and that none
could inherit property, or take by devise or bequest, except
by statute. The court concluded that consequiently such
right might at any time be abrogated by the same power
that created it.8 But these cases do no more than hold that
the right of inheritance is a civil right. They speak of it as
an incontrovertible fact. They offer no proof at all; it is
simply a statement that, because the right exists in the
statutory law of all nations, it is a civil right.
In Blackstone's Commentaries I is found the most intelli-
gent argument for the proponents of the civil right theory.
"The right of inheritance, or descent to the children and relations
of the deceased, seems to have been allowed much earlier than the
right of devising by testament. We are apt to conceive at first view
1 126 Cal. 112, 58 Pac. 462, 45 L. R. A. 788 (1899).
2 216 Ill. 23, 74 N. E. 809, 108 Am. St. Rep. 189 (1905).
3 See, also: Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900); In re Magnes'
Estate, 32 Colo. 527, 77 Pac. 853 (1904) ; Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 Ill. 122, 47
N. E. 321 (1897); State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 30 At. 76 (1894); Appeal of
Nettleton, 76 Conn. 235, 56 Atl. 565 (1903); In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 172 N. Y.
69, 64 N. E. 782 (1902); Eury's Ex'rs v. State, 72 Ohio St. 448, 74 N. E. 650(1905).
4 2 BL. CoMM. 11.
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that it has nature on its side; yet we often mistake for nature what
we find established by long and inveterate custom. It is certainly a wise
and effectual, but clearly a political, establishment; since the perma-
nent right of property, vested in the ancestor himself, was no natural,
but merely a civil, right. It is true that the transmission of one's pos-
sessions to posterity has an evident tendency to make a man a good
citizen and a useful member of society..."
But Blackstone in this statement seems to have lost sight
of the two-fold nature of man. Each individual has two
purposes. As an individual, he has a duty to himself; and
as a member of society, he has a social purpose. What
Blackstone speaks of as an "evident tendency" is actually
the duty man owes to society-to be a good citizen and to
be a useful member. The duty he owes to himself is self-
preservation and self-perfection. Because the ownership of
property is an aid to the fulfillment of the first, it is natural
that man should hold it; and because the right of property
is an extension of the right of self-preservation and of the
right to self-perfection, that right itself becomes a natural
right.
Blackstone's statement of the nature of the right of in-
heritance is criticized by Mr. Christian, who said of it:
"I cannot agree with the learned commentator that the permanent
right of property vested in the ancestor himself (that is, for his life)
is not a natural, but merely a civil right . . . I have endeavoured to
show . . . that the notion of property is universal and is suggested
to the mind of man by reason and nature, prior to all positive
institutions and civilized refinements. If the laws of the land
were suspended, we should be under the same moral and natural
obligation to refrain from invading each other's property as from
attacking and assaulting each other's persons. I am obliged also to
differ from the learned judge, and all writers upon general law, who
maintain that children have no better claim by nature to succeed to
the property of their deceased parents than strangers, and that the
preference given to them originates solely in political establishments.
I know no other criterion by which we can determine any rule or
obligation to be founded in nature than its universality, and by in-
quiring whether it is not, and has not been, in all countries and ages,
agreeable to the feelings, affections, and reason of mankind. The af-
fection of parents towards their children is the most powerful and
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universal principle which nature has planted in the human breast;
and it cannot be conceived, even in the most savage state, that any
one is so destitute of that affection and of reason, who would not
revolt at the position that a stranger has as good a right as his
children to the property of the deceased parent .... In the earliest
history of mankind we have express authority that this is agreeable
to the will of God himself:- 'And behold, the word of the Lord came
unto Abraham, saying, This shall not be thine heir; but he that shall
come out of thine own bowels shall be thine heir'."
If the right of inheritance is a natural right, the question
may be raised, as was done in Henson v. Moore,5 In what
heir or class of heirs does this right inhere? Does it belong
to the decedent's wife, to his children, or to his collateral
heirs? To the Illinois court, the power of the legislature to
designate the interest which a man's heirs shall take in his
property is inconsistent with any indefeasible natural right
of successon. In answering the query of the court, it is
necessary first to point out that it has never been contended
that collateral heirs enjoy a natural right of inheritance.
Neither is it here contended that the wife has a natural
right. Hers is a civil right, arising out of the civil duty upon
the husband to support her. With these heirs eliminated, the
difficulty proposed in Henson v. Moore is reduced to a min-
imum. The right would inhere in each child, if there be
more than one; and, being a natural right, it would be pos-
sessed equally by all. The court was probably misled through
a faulty interpretation of the word "designate." Certainly,
if the word means to deny, there is an insurmountable in-
consistency between the legislature's right to designate in-
heritances and an "indefeasible natural right of succession."
But a careful interpretation of the existing statutes shows
that the legislatures regulate, - they do not deny, - this
right. As Justice Winslow said, in Nunnemacher v. State:'
"It is true that these rights [to take property by inheritance or
will] are subject to reasonable regulation by the Legislature; lines of
descent may be prescribed, the persons who may take as heirs or
5 104 11. 403 (1882).
6 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627, 630 (1906).
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devisees may be limited, collateral relatives may doubtless be included
or cut off. . . and there may be much room for legislative action...
The fact that these powers exist and have been universally exercised
affords no ground for claiming that the legislature may abolish both
inheritances and wills, turn every fee simple title into a mere estate
for life, and thus, in effect, confiscate the property of the people once
every generation."
It is common to find the proponents of the civil right
theory calling upon history to support them, and to find that
their "history" consists almost entirely of reported cases,
each one of which refers to some earlier one in which it was
said that the idea that the right of inheritance is a civil
right is "elementary." A few go beyond the reported cases,
but the arguments remain in substance simply this: "Be-
cause we have always, from the earliest days, said so, it must
be true." In Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank I Mr.
Justice McKenna quoted from Blackstone:
"By the common law, as it stood in the reign of Henry II, a man's
goods were to be divided into three equal parts. .. ."
And in United States v. Perkins 8 the court referred to the
Code Napoleon, which limited the descent of a decedent's
estate under varying circumstances. But these arguments do
no more than to recognize the state's right to regulate, not
to deny, the right of inheritance.
Were these proponents to go back far enough, were they
to interpret what they would find in the only way it can
properly be interpreted, they would learn that the historical
arguments are overwhelmingly on the other side of the
question.
-It must be chiefly from history that this question is de-
termined. And "from the historical standpoint the idea that
all rights of property and rights to transmit the same by
inheritance ... have their origin in the positive enactments
of law by an established government cannot stand the test.
7 170 U. S. 283, 290, 291 (1898).
8 163 U. S. 625, 627 (1896).
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Governments have, indeed, from the earliest times, regulated
the exercise of these rights, prescribed ways and forms for
their exercise, and protected them by positive law; and so
they do now. From this universal exercise of the right of
regulation the idea of governmental right to create and de-
stroy may have arisen, . . ." "
The desire to inherit, to hold property, to give it to chil-
dren, is as natural in man as is the craving for food. It is
desired as something which will tend to make life more
pleasant, something which will make easier the accomplish-
ment of his duty to himself, the 'preservation of his life
and his self-perfection, and that to his dependents, their
support. From a time when the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary, man has striven to acquire property;
and he has engaged in battle to protect and preserve it for
his descendants.
As the ancestors claimed the right to hold property even
before the inception of governments, so also did their pos-
terity claim the right to inherit. "The right of descendants,
or some of them, to succeed to the ownership has been rec-
ognized from the dawn of human history. The birthright of
the first born existed long before Esau sold his right to the
wily Jacob; and the Mosaic law fairly bristles with pro-
visions recognizing the right of inheritance as then long
existing, and regulating its details. The most ancient known
codes recognize it as a right already existing .... ,, o
So blind have the courts been in their failure to make
proper and necessary distinctions between the right of in-
heritance and the right of testamentary disposition (which
undoubtedly is a civil right), that they have much maligned
the case of United States v. Perkins, by citing it as authority
for the civil right theory. It is patently an authority for the
9 Nunnemacher v. State, 108 N. W. 627, 629 (Wis. 1906), per Winslow, j.
10 Nunnemacher v. State, 108 N. W. 627, 629 (Wis. 1906), per Winslow, J.
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opposite point of view. "Though the general consent of the
most enlightened nations has, from the earliest historical
period, recognized a natural right in children to inherit the
property of their parents," the court says, "we know of no
legal principle to prevent the legislature from taking away
or limiting the right of testamentary disposition by imposing
such conditions upon its exercise as it may deem conducive
to public good." Their error lies in their failure to get the
full import of the last part of the sentence quoted in their
hurry to get past the first which expressly mentions the
right of inheritance to be a natural one.
But that the right of inheritance is a natural right may be
supported from the natural law. By the natural law-which
is a participation of the eternal law in rational beings, the
light, as it were, by which man knows what is good to be
done and what is evil to be avoided-there is in the parent
a natural duty in regard to the support and education of his
children. This obligation arises from the fact that the
parents are responsible for the life of the child. And be-
cause of the correlative nature of rights and duties, the
children have a corresponding natural right to have this duty
respected. The correlation of this right and duty is the
foundation of the family theory of property, which "assumes
that as man acquires property largely in order to leave it
to his children, for whom he ought to provide, there is
reasonable ground for demanding the perpetuity of the
means of family support." " This theory asserts that the
father is not the sole beneficial owner of his property, that
his possessions must serve a society consisting of the children
as well as the parents. With this same disposition of mind,
Professor Richard T. Ely writes:
"F. H. Geffcken says that the law of inheritance 'in its foundation
and purpose is the material continuity and safety of the family.' The
German philosopher, Trendelenburg, in his work on Natural Law, says
11 SaLIGMAN, ESSAYS iN TAXATION (1925) 130.
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that the right of inheritance exists first of all for the preservation of
the family, and that the wishes and purposes of the decedent come
second in order of importance." 12
It is probably because of this line of thought that we find in
parts of continental Europe "the survival of the . . . in-
stitution of compulsory children's share [and in some
jurisdictions of the United States laws which prohibit the
bequeathing of more than a certain portion of the estate
to charitable or public uses when there is a child or a
widow].. . ."13
St. Thomas Aquinas says, in his Summa Theologica: '4
"By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the rearing of
the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole life.
Hence it is of natural law thaf parents should lay up for their children,
and that children should be their parents' heirs."
And in his A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy 15
Cardinal Mercier adds that the father's property "is a joint
possession belonging to all the members of the [family]....
And therefore the children have a certain right to it during
the lifetime of the parents. But this right is suspended while
the parents are alive . . . . On the death of the parents the
right of the children comes, ipso facto, into effect; and this
is the right of inheritance."
Upon the nature of the right in the child to inherit his
father's property, the contentions of both sides have merit.
Regardless of the courts' confirmed opinions, the question
is yet open for conclusive proof. So long as the courts ap-
proach it with a closed mind, they will never prove beyond
rebuttal that it is not a natural right. In their present atti-
tude, as though they were omniscience itself, they settle
back upon their benches, clear their throats, and in a mighty
voice declare that the right to inherit is civil. But whether
12 ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION
oF WEALTH (1914) 427.
13 SELIGMAN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 131.
14 Pt. III, Supp. q. 67, Art. 1.
15 Vol. 11, p. 314.
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it is or not can make no difference in existing laws, whether
of descent or of taxation. As Justice Dodge said,, in his dis-
senting opinion in Nunnemacher v. State, "Whether such
transmission rests on inherent right such as the government
cannot take away, or upon a mere privilege which the
legislature might accord or deny, in its discretion, as so
generally asserted by high authority both legal and eco-
nomic, I deem a wholly academic question here. If the
former, the transfer, like other transfers of property, is a
customary and proper subject of taxation. If a mere privi-
lege, resting in grant by the legislature, still that grant has
been made, and a legal right of inheritance has been estab-
lished, and the statute under consideration obviously pro-
vides merely for a tax upon a recognized and existing right,
not for the revocation or denial of such right even in part."
As Justice Dodge says, if the right is natural, nevertheless,
the state may control it by virtue of the police power. The
only time that this problem might become important is at
such time when a theory of government whose adherents
denied the existence of all property rights should sweep the
country. The people are willing to see an expansion of pub-
lic property along certain lines; but if legislation was enacted
which made collective public property in capital and land
dominant, depriving them of their right to inherit, they
would rise in arms to test the government's prerogative, and
that without regard to whether it is a civil or a natural right.
Francis W. Matthys.
Chicago, Illinois.
